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Beautiful, Beloved, and Flawed  
Every therapeutic encounter is unique. My job as a counsellor is to 
track the grain of each encounter as closely as I can, never 
dominating or seeking to control, never using coercion or force 
however subtly. An internal logic will guide each session, and I will 
help my client best if I really listen to their words and for their 
experiencing, seeking to empathise and understand, and giving my 
intuition its freedom. At the same time, I can trust that my 
practice—which may look strange and insubstantial to critics—is 
supported by over half a century’s worth of empirically grounded 
theoretical concepts and structures; some of these have entered the 
mainstream, and some offer humane alternatives to current fads for 
counsellor-centred therapies and the medicalisation of human 
suffering.  
Can I sign my name to this? Is it true? The first part doesn't go far 
enough: there's more than this to effective person-centered 
therapy. As for the final sentence, I don't think I can extend my 
trust so far. Despite its elegance, and despite being deeply loved, 
person-centred theory is—as most theories eventually prove to 
be—deeply flawed. 
The flaw is conceptually simple: Classical person-centered theory 
requires that all the things which might bring a client to therapy 
originate in the conditions of worth the client has experienced 
(Rogers 1959), but this is contrary to the evidence. Other common 
etiological factors such as post-traumatic stress, lose-lose choices, 
bereavement, and childhood deprivation also bring clients to 
therapy, and they do not readily collapse into conditions of worth 
issues. Campbell Purton first drew attention to the problem 
(Purton 2002 and 2004), and I have restated it in several places 
(e.g. Mountford 2006a and 2006b). Yes, it might perhaps be shown 
that debilitating conditions of worth are associated with much 
client distress, but I foresee no way to reduce all client distress to 
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conditionality or account for the broad efficacy of person-centered 
counselling in such terms. Therefore, there must be more to 
person-centered counselling than what Mearns and Thorne have 
called "sabotaging conditions of worth" (2007, p. 98), and the 
classical account of how and why person-centered counselling 
works must be incomplete. 
Although there has been little overt response to this critique, 
perhaps recognition of the problem is quietly going mainstream. 
The new and third edition of Person-Centred Counselling In Action 
takes an interestingly different approach to person-centered 
theory. There is no longer any reference to Carl Rogers's (1957 and 
1959) necessity and sufficiency claim, the one which rests upon his 
assertion that all client distress grounds in conditionality, even 
though for many it remains a person-centered article of faith. 
Instead, there is simply a discussion of conditions of worth and an 
exploration of how the person-centered way of being is an antidote. 
There is also a lot of theoretical material post-dating conditions of 
worth theory, but to my eye—and in contrast to the first and 
second editions—there is no complete and consistent theory of 
person-centered counselling. 
Where has our theory gone? Is Campbell's critique (plus, perhaps, 
earlier objections to necessity and sufficiency chronicled by 
Kirschenbaum 2007, p. 592) finally bearing fruit? If the latter is 
the case, then I am both delighted and, as they say, "conflicted". I 
have spent much of the past six years working with trainee 
counsellors, and if in consequence of critical objections which I 
have been a party to I am now without a complete theoretical 
package to offer them, then that is not a result which I sought or 
desire. I want, therefore, to outline how I think such a package 
might be re-achieved. To that end, I first need to explore some 
aspects of the relationship between person-centered counselling 
and experiential focusing. 
It's All the Same Duck  
For me, person-centered counselling and experiential focusing have 
always gone together. That is one reason the opening statement 
does not go far enough for me. I trained in both simultaneously, 
and I find that therapeutic accompaniment is as much about being 
tuned to what is emerging from the implicit as anything I can 
represent in more "classically" person-centred terms. When, 
several years ago, I was asked to resurrect a person-centered 
training program in difficulties, I initially included experiential 
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focusing as a vehicle for personal development. However, some of 
the trainees were unwilling to leave matters there. Like me, they 
found that person-centered counselling and experiential focusing 
just didn't seem separable, and over time the place of focusing 
within our training program shifted. From a bolted on vehicle for 
personal development and fostering the "core" or "counsellor 
conditions" it became an inseparable aspect of the training, of how 
we think about therapeutic relationship, and—increasingly—of 
what we conceive person-centered counselling to be.  
At the heart of this shift is an important and perhaps original 
recognition: there is a continuum of modes of therapeutic relating 
which link the most structured and "formal" kind of focusing to 
what one might call "conversational therapy". The continuum has 
been described in detail elsewhere (Mountford 2006c), but I do 
need to introduce and discuss the main spine of it here in order to 




Closely Held Focusing 
Meditative Focusing 
 
When I first met focusing, I was introduced to what I now think of 
as meditative focusing: feet on the floor, eyes closed, clear a space, 
etc. This is the kind of practice described in Gene Gendlin's little 
self-help book Focusing (1981). Over time, and with the help of 
clients, I began to use focusing in a much less formal way and to 
gently encourage clients towards an awareness of their felt sense 
without invoking any focusing terminology. I might, for example, 
ask “Does that feel right?”, while patting my belly, and the client 
will (in focusing language) respond by resonating what has just 
been said with their felt sense and finding an answer. A 
counselling session utilizing this kind of focusing will usually 
involve many such short visits with the felt sense and subsequent 
returns to a more conventional mode of conversation. I'm sure the 
pattern is familiar to many focusing-oriented therapists (cf. 
Mearns and Thorne 2007, p. 80). I call it conversational focusing.  
So far, I believe, all this is pretty standard. What I want to 
describe next is perhaps less so. Although Gene Gendlin's Focusing 
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presents a meditative style of focusing, a more recent example of 
his work shows him very actively involved with the focuser, who is 
themselves very actively involved with Gene (Gendlin, date 
unavailable). Using students and eventually clients as co-
experimenters, I explored this way of focusing, and it has proved 
congenial and powerful. It is as purely and concentrated a focusing 
process as meditative focusing, and a session will often last as long 
or longer. The focusing companion, however, is much closer to, and 
much more actively in relationship with, the focuser. The 
companion can "hold" the focuser, and help them to accept their 
experiencing just as they might during more conversational 
exchanges. For both parties, the experience is one of intimacy and 
what is becoming known as "relational depth" (Cooper and Mearns 
2005). There really is no barrier, or possible barrier, between a 
focuser and a focusing companion who are both relating from their 
immediate felt experiencing, making frequent eye contact, and in 
steady verbal communication. Because such a distinctive way of 
relating needs a handle, my students, training colleagues, and I 
call it closely-held focusing. 
I say this is a distinctive way of relating, but I'm told that from an 
observer's perspective it looks (and reads) a lot like classical 
person-centered counselling. In a way that is unremarkable 
because most of the focusing companion’s responses will be "client-
centered" reflections and summaries; in another way it is deeply 
remarkable. This is focusing as any two people engaged in closely-
held focusing will assure you, but to an observer they won't, for the 
most part, appear to be focusing so much as engaging in intense 
person-centered counselling. I subscribe to the If it looks like a 
duck, and walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a 
duck. school of reasoning, and I think that closely-held focusing 
must be both a modality of focusing and a nuance of person-
centered counselling. The corollary is that focusing and person-
centered counselling cannot be as different as some believe. 
What Is the Paradigm?  
I don't wish to make him sound like a stuffed exhibit in the 
Counselling Hall of Fame, but Brian Thorne is for many the 
paradigmatic person-centered counsellor, and Brian has made 
video records of his work. In The Cost of Integrity Brian (1997) can 
be observed not just offering the loving presence and acceptant 
relationship which he is noted for; he can also be seen relating to 
his client in a manner readily understood in focusing terms. I have 
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put it to Brian that, in general, he is guided throughout his 
interaction with clients by what in focusing terms would be called 
his own "felt sense", and that he systematically responds to his 
clients in such a way that they are gently (and not always so 
gently) encouraged deeper into their own experiencing and into 
relationship with their felt sense. He agrees. He also agrees that 
this description applies to Carl Rogers’s later work as well. (As 
Greenberg (1996) has argued.) In other words, two of the most 
effective and influential representatives of person-centred therapy 
can be understood as working in ways which are partly explicable 
in focusing terms. (Process experientialists like Greenberg have a 
different but related way of thinking about this which I'm not 
going to discuss here. See for example Kirschenbaum (2007) pp. 
530-533.) 
From here it is a small step to the claim that conversational 
person-centered counselling—or conversational therapy as I called 
it above—is closely related to conversational focusing which in turn 
connects to closely-held and meditative focusing. Thus, in addition 
to the apparent duality of closely-held focusing, there is a clear link 
running from conversational person-centered counselling to the 
most structured and formal kind of focusing.  
Is that a duck I see running loose? 
One Therapy; Two Legs  
A simple and for me compelling explanation for what I am 
asserting is that person-centered counselling and experiential 
focusing do not just share a common origin in the collaborative 
work of Carl Rogers and Gene Gendlin, they are different and 
differently emphasized aspects of the same fundamentally 
indivisible way of offering therapy. One aspect of this way of 
offering therapy is the utterly acceptant—and at times 
passionately acceptant—relationship within which counsellor and 
client can be themselves without fear or any pretence. It is the 
kind of relationship which Brian Thorne promotes as central to 
effective therapy and which Dave Mearns now theorizes as having 
"relational depth". Another aspect of this way of offering therapy is 
the recognition that human beings and human experiencing are 
processes, that process sometimes needs a little friendly attention 
in order to run smoothly, and that in any case attending to our 
awareness of awareness is probably the most important thing a 
human being can do. (That is not a typo.) 
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I have likened these twin aspects to the two "legs" of therapy 
(Mountford 2006c), and I find that I still favour that image. If we 
look back to the 1950s, and particularly if we consider Rogers’s 
(1956) unpublished address “The Essence of Psychotherapy: 
Moments of Movement”, then it seems clear that what eventually 
became person-centered counselling and focusing-oriented 
counselling was one entity moving forward upon two "legs" : there 
was relationship and there was attention to process. (Cf. 
Kirschenbaum 2007 pp. 528-529.) More recent exponents give the 
impression—or at least I gain the impression from more recent 
exponents—that a counsellor can get around just fine using only 
one of these legs, but—for me—hopping is inadequate locomotion. 
I do not know whether what I am now claiming will seem self-
evident, or controversial or just plain misguided. However, if I am 
right, then the practice I am describing needs a theoretical story 
which stresses both relationship and attention to process, and I 
think that I have the beginnings of one. It isn't fully worked out 
yet, but it does promise the theoretical package for trainees which 
I lamented earlier.  
That proviso suitable for trainees really is important. Although 
Gendlin himself has an evolving and deeply impressive body of 
theory, and despite my nearly 40 years of pedagogic experience, I 
cannot imagine how I would teach Gendlin's theory to a cohort of 
counsellors in training. What I need is the kind of neat and 
accessible package provided by the first two editions of Person-
Centred Counselling in Action and derived from Rogers's 1957 and 
1959 papers. Students understand and like that package.  
That Lego Spaceship  
Suppose that years ago you were given a model spaceship made out 
of Lego. You really prized the spaceship, and you put it on a shelf 
to admire. Over time, it acquires dust, and it begins to look a very 
dated kind of spaceship. You might, of course, revere it so highly 
that you just continue to leave it alone. Or you might take it down 
and make some small modifications which update it. Or you might 
even say to yourself that it is after all made of Lego, and there is 
no reason why it cannot be broken down into its constituent parts 
and assembled quite differently. The first and reverential option is 
akin to the way person-centered purists relate to our tradition. The 
second option is akin to what Mearns and Thorne have done in 
their recent book. The third option is the one which attracts me. 
Although there is no doubt that in his 1957 and 1959 papers Carl 
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Rogers gives pride of place to conditions of worth theory and the 
necessity and sufficiency claim, and there is certainly no doubt 
that this is part of what makes the theoretical package so elegant 
and appealing, there is also no reason why we might not build 
something a little different with the materials provided. 
Of the constituent claims of classical person-centered theory, one 
group draws my interest at least as powerfully as the conditions of 
worth material. It is the things Rogers says about incongruence 
and distortion and denial. For example, the second of the famous 
six conditions states "…the client…is in a state of incongruence, 
being vulnerable or anxious." (1957, p. 221) In other words, every 
client who comes to therapy is incongruent, distorting and denying 
their experiencing, and this can be thought of as the reason why 
they are coming to therapy: living with this level of incongruence is 
just not sustainable or worthwhile. For the client who engages 
with therapy, the direction of travel is towards greater congruence, 
greater "capacity and tendency to symbolize experiences accurately 
in awareness" (1959, p. 234), and greater openness to experiencing. 
Thus it is consistent with the 1957 and 1959 papers (and in 
keeping with Rogers’s broader interests) to characterize therapy as 
perhaps one of many kinds of process whereby a person moves 
away from distortion and denial and towards what might be 
characterized as "awareness and acceptance", towards (in Gene 
Gendlin's phrase) "making friendly" with their experiencing. In the 
1957 and 1959 conceptions, the fundamental reason for 
incongruence is always traceable to conditions of worth, but I see 
only benefit in recognizing that things aren't quite so simple and 
many different springs can feed our need for what eventually 
becomes a kind of crippling dishonesty with, and alienation from, 
ourselves and our environment. 
What I am suggesting now destroys the neat, self-sustaining 
system of belief provided by adherence to conditions of worth 
theory coupled with the necessity and sufficiency claim, but that 
loss looks increasingly a blessing. When I think how much so-
called person-centered training and practice has become something 
of which the best one can say is that it probably does no harm, and 
I reread Carl Rogers’s views on Freud's "insecure disciples" and 
their "iron chains of dogma" (Rogers 1959, p.191), it begins to seem 
that our neat, self-sustaining system has become a thing to 
smother us. 
 8 
When First We Practice To Deceive…  
Developing a theoretical statement applicable to conversational 
therapy, meditative focusing, and everything in between, and filling 
the hole left by excising the necessity and sufficiency claim, leaves 
no choice but to reassemble those Lego pieces. An additional 
benefit of doing so may be at least a partial antidote to creeping 
dogmatisation. However, contrary to what I suggested in 
Mountford (2006c) I cannot begin by appealing to the usual notion 
of congruence I have just been discussing. It is important to be 
clear about the reason for this. Congruence is originally a 
geometric concept applicable to isometric shapes (triangles, in the 
classroom context), and therefore two clearly identifiable shapes 
must exist before we can say that congruence is exhibited. As the 
term is used in counselling, there must still be two clearly 
identifiable things—such as experiencing and behaviour—before 
we can speak of congruence. Focusing, however, is about that 
which does not yet exist. It is a process whereby we seek and 
prepare to receive a felt sense, attend while the felt sense forms, 
and then acquire a handle or some kind of "name" for that felt 
sense. Focusing is a little like sitting beside what may prove to be a 
rabbit hole, or may turn out to be some other kind of hole 
altogether, and waiting to see what emerges. What is more, if we 
take seriously what Gendlin has to say about the nature of the 
implicit—and, perhaps, when we pay close attention to our own 
experience of the implicit—we find that there is neither a rabbit 
nor anything else down that hole initially: whatever emerges into 
awareness does so in consequence of us paying attention and cannot 
be said to have been there prior to our attention. Therefore, we 
cannot speak of congruence and incongruence in a focusing context. 
It is about here that my job becomes more difficult. I have a clear 
sense, a felt sense, of a way of being which is characterized both by 
a high degree of congruence in the person-centered sense and by a 
high degree of openness to whatever may emerge from the implicit 
and into awareness. This way of being has to do with a relatively 
comfortable and confident relationship with the moment by 
moment play of my experience, but I fear that I am already 
pushing against the boundaries of the language I'm using, and I 
find no simple word or phrase to characterize what I'm talking 
about. I do think that it is a way of being, and I do incline to 
characterize that way of being as a preparedness to accept and 
hold in awareness whatever is, here and now. I also recognize that 
what I'm saying may be less than transparently clear to anyone 
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else, and so I will try approaching all this from a different 
direction.  
Working in environmental ethics as well as counselling, I'm aware 
how much philosophical time and energy has been spent trying to 
specify what makes human beings different from other animals, 
and I have my own contribution to offer. Human beings are 
spectacularly good at deceiving each other, deceiving themselves, 
and interfering with their own psychological process and 
experiencing. We really are very good at incongruence and a kind 
of dissociation which separates us from the implicit, from the 
organic emergence of awareness, and from knowing how it really is 
to be us in any given situation. Initially, this is functional within 
our environment. We deny and distort our experiencing in order to 
try to meet conditions of worth and maintain a particular self-
concept. (Classical person-centered theory.) We retreat from our 
experiencing and smother our feelings almost before they are born 
because we cannot, or we fear that we cannot, hold and survive 
them. (Fragile process.) We blot out our experience, or attribute 
experiences to separated parts of ourselves, because they are 
unbearable. (Dissociative process and, I would suggest, post 
traumatic stress.) We separate into different and sometimes 
deniable configurations in order to deal with paradox, conflict, and 
competing demands upon us. (Configuration theory.) We set aside 
our feelings and experiences because there simply isn't opportunity 
to process them. (Bereavement, traumatic incidents, war, etc.) The 
list could be continued, but I hope that what is here illustrates my 
point: we routinely practice the antithesis of what I am loosely 
calling openness, awareness, and acceptance on an everyday basis 
and mostly for initially good reasons. Then circumstances change, 
perhaps we change independently of our circumstances, and what 
was once functional becomes problematic. We recognize that 
something is wrong with us and with our lives. Some of us then 
seek therapy. The therapist's job—as I currently conceive of it, and 
I believe this conception compatible with both classical person-
centered theory and focusing practice—is to provide an 
environment and a kind of accompaniment which makes it possible 
for the client to move towards that degree of openness, awareness, 
and acceptance which, overall, works best for them right now. This 
can then result in further change and the yearning for yet more 
openness, awareness, and acceptance and so therapy can 
sometimes become a very long-term process of "self-development". 
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A Job Description with Familiar Consequences  
If the therapist's job is, for the most part, as described, then some 
important claims advanced by classical person-centered theory are 
close to logical consequences of that description. For brevity, I will 
present them in point form. (Much that is claimed for "the 
therapeutic alliance", e.g. Kirschenbaum (2007) pp. 594-598, is 
perhaps similarly explicable, but my present concern is person-
centred theory.)  
1. It is pretty much axiomatic that a client can only go where the 
therapist can, and is willing, to follow. Therefore, a therapist 
must themselves be seeking openness, acceptance, and 
awareness, and be relatively open, acceptant, and aware when 
with their client. (Cf. condition 3, Rogers 1957, p. 221.) A 
therapist who is less in touch with their experiencing than their 
client may make the client’s difficulties greater. (I have heard 
Mary Hendricks cite research supporting this assertion, but I 
have not yet tracked it down.) 
2. If the purpose of therapy is to foster openness, acceptance, and 
awareness, then it will be best if the therapist starts by 
accepting and really trying to understand and enter into their 
client’s individual phenomenal reality. We are social and 
relational creatures, and whether or not we are burdened with 
problematic conditions of worth, it is easier for us to be open 
and acceptant towards our experiencing when we are with 
others who understand, accept, and value our experiencing. 
Furthermore, if we doubt our own worth and the value of our 
experiencing, and particularly if it is difficult to be our 
experiencing for reasons like shame, then acknowledging what 
we are and what we are feeling will be a whole lot easier 
knowing that we are in the company of someone who really does 
unconditionally accept us and perhaps even loves us. (C.f. 
Conditions 4 and 5, Rogers 1957, p. 221.) 
3. The kind of acceptance involved here is acceptance of one's own 
experiencing, of who and what one is and how that feels, of how 
it is to be this particular locus of awareness and evaluation 
within this particular phenomenal reality. Such awareness 
cannot be gained in consequence of someone else interpreting 
us, or explaining us to ourselves, or telling us how it is to be us: 
it must grow from within, and there is no other way to acquire 
it. (C.f. classical person-centered non-directivity.) 
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4. This does not mean that there are never times when it makes 
sense for the therapist to offer suggestions, disagree, or even 
argue with their client on the basis of their experiencing. It 
does, however, mean that such things must always be done 
within a context and in such a way that the client is entirely 
free and able to reject what the therapist is saying in favour of 
their own experiencing. 
5. Given these points, something much like the overall person-
centered relationship expounded and exemplified by Mearns 
and Thorne (2007) is close to being a logical consequence of the 
way I have described the therapeutic enterprise.  
Note that there is no theoretical reliance upon conditions of worth 
in any of this, but that when conditions of worth are adversely 
affecting a client, then just about everything said by classical 
person-centered theory remains applicable.  
Now what about the focusing side of things? 
A Culture of Dissociation 
Like some spiritual and meditative practices, regular engagement 
with experiential focusing leads not just to a recognition that 
human beings are superlatively good at meddling with their 
experiencing, but that we are living at a place and in time whereby 
a particular kind of meddling is highly rewarded. I have described 
elsewhere how our culture separates the cerebral and the rational 
from the inward and the personal (Mountford 2006a, section 9.), 
and with the possible exception of the arts and entertainment the 
former is rewarded while the latter is disparaged. Thus we are 
encouraged from an early age to become divided creatures, to turn 
away from the inward and the personal, and to strive towards a 
paradigm of rationality which is more deeply a paradigm of 
dissociation. My sense is that most of the clients I have worked 
with are afflicted in this way. When a client tells me "I don't know 
who I am.", that usually cashes out as "I'm not in contact with my 
experiencing.” 
Therapeutic focusing is an antidote to all this and a way of 
beginning to rebalance ourselves. We are not—as a client recently 
told me his prior life and education led him to believe—a brain on a 
stick. We are an organism, an animal that has evolved a large and 
capable brain in the service of its organismic needs. The organism 
is not there just to support and pander to the brain; if anything, 
matters are the other way around. Although as I write that I 
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recognize how much I am beginning to view this whole 
dichotomised conception of ourselves as fundamentally disordered. 
Feeling and thinking—living in awareness of the implicit and the 
emergent, and taking time to reason things through—are probably 
innately much closer to one indivisible process than it is possible 
for someone raised and educated as I have been to comprehend. 
Therefore, it is essential when working with clients who seek 
openness, awareness, and acceptance that something much like 
focusing be available to them as and when they're ready to engage 
with it. Implicated in most client distress will be a degree of 
culturally mediated dissociative process and a lack of awareness 
and trust in the implicit and their own felt sensing.  
One (Indivisible) Relational Offering  
I wrote earlier about what I think of as counselling's two legs, and 
it is now possible to say more about their similarity and difference. 
For the most part, classical person-centered counselling involves 
offering a particular kind of relationship to another (the client) so 
that they can experience (and if necessary begin to develop) that 
kind of relationship with themselves. Focusing companionship 
simply in and of itself involves offering a particular kind of 
relationship to another's felt sense (the focuser’s), and to that which 
is implicit for them, so that they can more readily experience (and 
if necessary begin to develop) that kind of relationship for 
themselves.  
In both cases, the relationship can be characterized in terms of 
openness, awareness, and acceptance. What differs is the recipient, 
and I think that this is why, at least in conversation, Brian Thorne 
has expressed some reservations about the use of focusing within 
counselling: he fears the loss of person-to-person relationship. If I 
am right, however, and if being close to our felt sense and the 
implicit in a friendly and welcoming manner is integral to our 
humanity, and if a much tighter integration of that which is felt 
and that which is thought is both natural to us and in our best 
interests, then we cannot really distinguish relating 
therapeutically to the individual and relating therapeutically to 
their felt experiencing. That merging of the two kinds of 
relationship is precisely what I believe I noticed about Brian's own 
way of working, and it probably constituted the initial grain of 
sand around which all this theorizing and argument has gathered. 
There remain two threads which need noting even if I cannot tie 
them off. 
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The first thread is the question: What is to be done about the 
actualizing tendency? For some, the actualizing tendency is a 
treasured part of person-centered theory, and there is certainly no 
analog within focusing theory. That is because focusing theory 
doesn't need one. If we are working with a process-conception of 
human being, it is otiose to say that either the process or the 
individual "actualizes" because, by definition, a process is already 
doing just that. Perhaps another way to put this is that a living 
organism can be counted on to get on with living, and to do its best 
to flourish within its environment without any need for steering or 
pushing interventions from outside, because that's just 
(empirically) how organisms are. The "actualizing tendency" is 
ontologically unnecessary. However, if it is felt useful and 
necessary, or if I'm getting something badly wrong, then I cannot 
see that invoking an actualizing tendency causes problems for 
anything I have said here. 
The second thread is highlighted by a remark made by Judy Moore 
when I presented some of these thoughts to a recent process model 
symposium. She noted a very Buddhist feel to my conception of 
therapy. I'm sure Judy is right, and it can hardly be an accident 
given that I have been engaged in Buddhist practice longer than I 
have been a therapist. However, so far as I can ascertain, 
everything which I say here is drawn directly from person-centered 
theory, focusing theory, and my own clinical and focusing practice. 
Moving towards a conception of therapy involving Buddhist 
practice and theory would necessitate considering the roots of 
human suffering as understood within Buddhism. It would be a 
very different conception, and all that I want right now is a 
theoretical story to tell about focusing oriented person-centered 
counselling because that is what I offer to my clients and seek to 
teach my students. 
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